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FUTURE INTERESTS-TRUSTS-TIME FOR AsCERTAINMENT OF HEIRS AFrER 
LIFE ESTATE IN TRUST WITH UNEXERCISED PoWER OF APPOINTMENT AND No 
GIFT IN DEFAULT-The testator set up a testamentary trust for the benefit 
of his wife for life and gave her a general testamentary power to appoint the 
remainder in fee. No gift in default was provided. The life beneficiary died 
without exercising the power. On petition by the trustee for directions for 
the final distribution- of the trust property, the trial court held that the 
property went to those who were the heirs of the testator at the time of his 
death. On appeal, held, reversed, two judges dissenting. The trustees took 
full title to the trust property and no interest in this property remained 
in the testator's estate undisposed of by the will. When the life beneficiary 
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died without exercising the power of appointment, the trust property rein-
vested in the testator's estate by virtue of a :resulting trust and descended to 
those who were the heirs of the testator at the time of the death of the 
life beneficiary. Butler v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 211 Ga. 414, 
86 S. E. (2d) 520 (1955). 
The old common law rule that "seizin is the stock of descent" necessi-
tated the determination of the heirs at the end of the preceding freehold.1 
This rule.has been universally abrogated except in a minority of jurisdic-
tions which hold that their statutes of descent and distribution do not ap-
ply to possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken.2 
In the leading case of Blount v. Walker the South Carolina court drew an 
analogy between a possibility of reverter after a fee conditional and a result-
ing trust after a fee simple in the trustee.8 Because that court was commit-
ted to the minority viewpoint concerning the descendability of possibilities 
of reverter, it held that the time for ascertainment of heirs in the resulting 
trust situation should be at the end of the preceding freehold. To the ex-
tent that this analogy to the possibility of reverter cases was relied upon 
by the South Carolina court, the Blount case should not have been cited as 
authority for the result reached in the principal case unless the Georgi~ 
court meant to abandon its past indication of alignment with the majority 
viewpoint.4 In the principal case, the Georgia court based its decision on the 
theory that, for the duration of the life beneficiary's equitable estate, all 
other legal and equitable property interests remained vested in the trustees, 
leaving nothing to vest in the heirs of the testator at the time of his death. 
Therefore, it concluded, when the property returns by way of resulting 
trust to the testator's estate at the time of the life beneficiary's death, it 
descends to those persons who would have been the testator's heirs had he 
died at that time.6 Other courts have also used the existence of a fee in 
1 Seizin was regarded as necessary for the descent of interests in land. Thus, if A, 
possessing the fee interest, conveyed to B for life and thereafter died without having dis-
posed of the reversion, it descended at the moment of the life tenant's death to the per-
sons who would have been A's heirs had A died at that later time. This also applied to 
remainders. 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §722 (1936). Cited in the past to support the re-
sult reached in the principal case was Conner Exr. v. Waring, 52 Md. 724 (1879). This 
case was based upon the rule of seizin, and was overruled by Perkins v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 
520, 39 A. (2d) 672 (1944). 
2 Thus in the states that have adopted the minority point of view, these interests 
are treated much IIS they were at common law. See 37 VA. L. REv. 117 (1951); 77 A.L.R. 
344 (1932). 
s 31 S.C. 13, 9 S.E. 804 (1888). This was a two to one decision with a strong dissenting 
opinion pointing out that the trustee's interest ought not prevent the vesting of the re-
versionary interest. Cf. Waller v. Waller, 220 S.C. 212, 66 S.E. (2d) 876 (1951). 
4 Cooper v. Davis, 174 Ga. 670, 163 S.E. 736 (1932). 
IS Principal case at 420. The court apparently misinterpreted some loose language 
in an adverse possession case [Cushman v. Coleman, 92 Ga. 772, 19 S.E. 46 (1893)] which 
held that when the legal fee is in the trustee .an adverse possessor can cut off all legal 
and equitable interests. The court in that case did not hold that the title to the equitable 
remainder is in the trustee. In actuality, the case has very little relevance to the problem 
in the principal case. Nor should the unexercised power of appointment have any effect. 
Bienvenu v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 193 Ga. 101, 17 S.E. (2d) 257 (1941). See also 
92 A.LR. 363 (1934). 
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the trustees as a rationale for postponing the ascertainment of heirs. For 
example, in In re Estate of Mooney the Nebraska court reasoned that since 
the resulting trust arises at the end of the preceding freehold estate, the 
heirs are determined at that time, arguing that the existence of the fee in 
the trustees prevents intestacy until then.6 A sounder approach to the prob-
lem was demonstrated by the Georgia court in Lane v. Citizens & Southern 
National Bank.1 In that case, the court recognized that when the equitable 
title is split from the legal title, it should be treated in equity just as the 
legal title is handled at law.8 On this basis, a more logical solution to the 
problem in the principal case would be to recognize that although the en-
tire legal estate is disposed of, the entire equitable or beneficial interest is 
not. In other words, the testator, possessing both a legal and equitable fee 
simple and having disposed of merely an equitable life interest, with a gen-
eral power to appoint the full remainder by will, retains a vested equitable 
reversion in fee subject to complete defeasance upon exercise of the power. 
This reversion should be regarded as vesting in his heirs immediately upon 
his death. A similar analysis has been made by a majority of the courts.9 
·In addition, in view of the general ill repute of the old English doctrine of 
seizin,10 the fact that the result under the theory of the principal case is 
similar is not in its favor. Nor can the result be justified as a rule of intent. 
The testator probably has not considered this contingency at all, or, if he 
has, the fact that the trustee holds the legal fee cannot be considered any 
indication of an intent to postpone the ascertainment of those who take as 
his heirs. The best explanation of the result probably lies in the particular 
facts of the case: by virtue of the decision the property descended to the 
testator's brother instead of to his wife's twenty-five relatives.11 This is 
probably justification enough. 
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6 131 Neb. 52, 267 N.W. 196 (1936). The courts are never too clear whether the word 
"reversion" describes the act of the estate becoming reinvested in the grantor or the right 
to this future enjoyment. The Nebraska court seems to ignore the latter meaning. 
7 195 Ga. 828, 25 S.E. (2d) 800 (1943). In this case, a contingent remainder had failed 
and the court held that the trust estate reverting to the estate of the testator should be 
divided into six shares, the testator having died leaving six children. The widow of one 
child who died before the life beneficiary, but after the testator, took a child's share as 
the sole heir of her husband. 
Bid. at 833. 
9 The New Jersey court has stated that whenever it appears that the grantee or devisee 
takes only the legal estate, the equitable interest that remains undisposed of goes to the 
testator's heirs determined as of the testator's death. Mulford v. Mulford, 42 N.J. Eq. 68, 
6 A. 609 (1886). In a well-considered opinion criticizing Blount v. Walker, note 3 supra, 
as contrary to the weight of authority, the Rhode Island court reasoned that since the 
resulting trust arises solely by operation of law and not by any intention of the testator, 
the only persons who can take under a resulting trust are the heirs at law, these being 
the persons who take immediately upon the death of the ancestor. The court concluded 
that it is not critical in cases of this kind whether the heirs take a legal or only an 
equitable interest. Champagne v. Fortin, 69 R.I. IO, 30 A. (2d) 838 (1943). See, generally, 
27 A.L.R. (2d) 691 (1953). 
10 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §723 (1936). 
11 See also In re Estate of Mooney, 131 Neb. 52 at 57, 267 N.W. 196 (1936), for another 
pragmatic application of this rule. 
